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A Meaner, More
Punitive Nation
Bruce Berner

President Bush's much
burlesqued yearning for a "kinder,
gentler nation" deserves more
serious attention. It proceeds
from an assumption that, collectively, we are currently mean and
punitive. But are we? What
gauges exist to measure our meanness-gentleness quotient? There
are many symptoms, such as the
creeping disappearance of simple
courtesy, but I agree with the opinion of deTocqueville that one of
the clearest indicators of a society's civility is the way it treats its
criminals. This piece scans the
recent American criminal punishment landscape and concludes
that the President's wish may be
granted. We may become kinder
and gentler because that is about
the only direction left open. We
have, I argue, hit near-bottom in
mindless, punitive reaction to
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cnme. To demonstrate this, I discuss a series of recent cases and
statutes.
Before the young Republicans assail this piece as the latest
bleeding-heart entry in the waron-crime debate, let me suggest
that such charge would be misdirected. The issue herein is not the
means for fighting crime. The
events which are chronicled here
are outside any sensible debate on
law enforcement or penology.
Among the justifications
ordinarily offered for punishment
for crime are deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation, education,
restraint, disapprobation, and
reinforcement of norms. We can
argue about these and redesign
punishment as we learn more
about them. We may choose to
commit more or fewer resources
to the crime problem as political
tides ebb and flow. And, of
course, we do. Such is the war-oncrime debate. How many years in
jail will most effectively prevent
robbery? Should we throw more
or fewer dollars in to the effort to
rehabilitate offenders? Should we
spend more energy on crime,
drug, and alcohol education?
Does the death penalty deter?
Can people ever really change?

0
There remains, however,
an undeniable, critical, aim of
punishment variously identified as
'just desert," "revenge," or "retribution." We punish in part
because some fundamental
instinct tells us that deviance
should prompt outrage which in
turn should prompt the infliction
of suffering on the deviant. Kant
even had a calculus, complete with
pluses and minuses, for exacting
retribution. Unless and until the
correct "payment" was made (neither too high nor too low), the
cosmos was misaligned. We, with-

out this technical apparatu ,
ticulately sense that if cer
conduct goes unpunished.
world is out of whack. While l
punishment aims, like preven
or rehabilitation, reside in em
cal, logical, and psycholo 1
realms, retribution is almost.,.
ly the product of how outraged
feel and of our sense of pro
tion in quenching that outra
How much pure retribution
demand (after we have exhau
the preventive, educational, rc
bilitative,
etc.
effects
punishment) is a powerful bar
eter of our collective mood.
One final introductu
observation. Punishment f
crime is relatively high in the n
ed States. Length of prison ter
actually served for comparab
offenses is nowhere else so hig
The percentage of population 1
prison is higher only in the Smi
Union and South Africa. Th
death penalty is abandoned in m·
tually every other Westerr
industrialized country. But eve
accepting typical American punishment as a baseline, th
following events seem to suggest
current American retributi\
impulse amazing in magnitude.
Cameron Kocher. Nin ·
year-old Cameron Kocher took hi
father's high-powered rifle and
killed a seven-year-old girl as sht
whizzed by on a snowmobile. I!
may have been an accident; it rna
have been intentional. A jury will
soon sort that out ~ince the Stat
of Pennsylvania is trying Cameron
for murder.
Ray and Faye Copeland
This couple is accused of thre
murders. The State of Missoun
seeks the death penalty. He is 75:
she is 68.
juvenile death penaltJ.
Many states are imposing capital
punishment on persons aged 16
and 17. Some had been sentencing persons 15, 14, or younger to
death until the Supreme Court
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led the practice unconstitutionas "cruel and unusual."
nether or not it is cruel, it was
t all that unusual.
Abolition of the insanity
fense. A large number of states
mcluding Indiana) have virtually
lished the defense of insanity.

Before sorting through this, I
oncede that these actions have
e n taken through judgments of
few people or bodies not always
o mpletely responsive to the contituencies they are supposed to
r present. But there are so many
ecent instances like these and so
attle negative reaction to them
at they can be fairly employed to
o rtray the culture from which
ey spring.
None of the listed events
an be fully explained by invoking
deterrent, rehabilitative, or educative purposes . The idea of
deterring Cameron or other "simirly motivated" nine-year-old boys
b.,· convicting him of murder is
pretty bizarre. (For one thing, to
ell a nine-year old that if he kills
n purpose, he is a murderer, is to
amply to him that such actions are
ith in the realm of his choice.
he re are some nine-year olds
t left ignorant on that point.) I
·ouldn't want to have to argue
that putting Cameron in jail will
make him better. The experience
up to now seems to have been lost
n him. At pretrial conferences,
he c ommunicates (when he is
wake) solely by tugging on his
wyer's sleeve to ask when he can
o home. He seems also to have
missed a few of the more subtle
o ral issues of his conduct and
pcoming trial by telling all who
em upset by this killing, "If you
o n't think about it, you won't be
d."
Non e of this suggests
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Cameron need not be dealt with.
He needs help of all kinds and, if
the killing was intentional, has
needed it for a while. Family,
church, school, counselling, the
juvenilejustice system all may be
appropriate. But to bring to bear
on him the criminal justice system,
that awesome apparatus designed
to channel and express the moral
condemnation of the community,
is to seek revenge without
thought. I have talked about this
case with a number of child psychiatrists, grade-school principals,
and fourth-grade teachers, all people who deal with the behavior
and mentality of nine-year-olds
regularly. Not one could see any
sense in this prosecution other
than an unreasoned manifestation
of fear and retaliation. Cameron's
case is not quite the fulfillment of
the worst-case scenario, for Pennsylvania, as well as several other
states, could bring the same
charge against a child as young as
seven. (Read my lips, "s-e-v-e-n.")
Indiana law patiently waits until
the child reaches ten.
Annually in the United
States, about 250 children under
twelve gain access to a gun and kill
someqne. It is a problem. Most of
these cases are dealt with officially
by the juvenile system. Many are
the result of careless adults who
may be appropriately sued civilly
or punished criminally. Some are,
irreducibly, the price paid for permitting private weapon possession.
As Ollie North likes to say, "It's a
dangerous world out there." But
let us not move toward "solving"
this problem with the electric
highchair.
And in the case of the
elderly Copelands, criminal prosecution is surely appropriate as is
serious punishment if they are
convicted. This case moves us into
more uncertain issues of degree. I
do not argue here that imposing

the death penalty on the elderly is
unjust, only that it is symptomatic
of an extremely strong retributive
impulse. It is akin to shooting a
mouse with a cannon. Most serious studies cast grave doubt on
whether the threat of capital punishment ever has measurable
deterrent effect, and presumably
any such effect would be diminished when aimed at persons
nearer the end of their lives. So,
rather than pass over the question
with rhetoric about deterrence
and wars on crime, let us admit
that we need to kill people like the
Copelands to get our fair measure
of revenge, that imprisoning them
for the rest of their lives is simply
and finally not enough.
The same analysis applies
to executing teenagers. The only
plausible explanation for doing it
is to exact retributive payment. If
we are afraid of what they may do,
they can be restrained; we have as
much power to deliver life sentences with no prospect of release
as we do to kill. As to deterrence
of others, if we cannot demonstrate that the death penalty
influences adults, can anyone
believe that the problem gets less
complicated when we introduce
the teenage mind? I've been
unsuccessfully trying for years to
deter my fifteen-year-old son from
leaving his coat on the floor,
which seems less complex than
preventing killing. (I often wonder if it would help if I didn't leave
mine on the floor.)
Even when the death
penalty is not involved but the
debate is over how long a prison
term should be, Americans consistently intuit a period of time long
by any comparative standard. Law
students often complain about
some perpetrator of, say, a petty
theft, "getting off with only a year
in jail." I understand, indeed
share, their frustration with crime,
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but I wonder what would lead anyone to put the word "only" in a
sentence that contains "year in
jail."
The movement toward
abolition of the insanity defense
suggests either an unwillingness or
an inability to distinguish illness
from evil. If this statutory trend
were simply a confession of inability, abolition would be defensible
on deterrence grounds-after all,
insanity can be faked, so if we
make the defense unavailable, we
will at least deter the would-be fakers. (Trying to figure out how to
deter the truly insane will only
make your head hurt.) Yet, there
are a variety of ways to control the
uncertainties of the distinction
between illness and criminality
without destroying the decisive
moral difference . These may
include: maintaining a definition
of insanity which includes only
gross mental illness and excludes
neurotics and persons with personality disorders, conditions not
only less serious, but more difficult to diagnose with accuracy;
restricting the scope of expert psychiatric testimony so that the
ultimate question remains a moral
one for the jury, not a "clinical"
one for experts or pseudo-experts;
placing the burden of proving
insanity squarely on the defendant; increasing the standard of
proof as by requiring defendants
to prove insanity by "clear and
convincing evidence." The failure
to try such intermediate steps (a
few states have and they seem to
work) suggests that, for many,
there is not an inability, but an
unwillingness, to maintain the distinction between criminality and
illness.
The whole theory of criminal punishment, however, rests
on the assumption that humans
are creatures with the capacity to
make choices. When facts demonstrate that the choice to kill or not
28

is unduly compromised, we either
applaud the choice as right Uustification defenses like self-defense)
or recognize that to ask more of a
person in such a position is to ask
too much (excuse defenses like
duress). Insanity, when properly
defined, is the label for people
who have so far lost the capacity to
make choices or to discern the
propriety of those choices that no
criminal punishment could be
effective or appropriate. If they
are dangerous, we should protect
ourselves from them. There are
many legal and extralegal techniques for this. For example, we
quarantine those with serious,
communicable diseases. But we
don't view it as "punishment," we
don't insist on visiting a criminal
conviction on them, on announcing to them that they are to be
morally condemned. There are
many factors in this complex question of abolishing the insanity
defense. One fair conclusion,
however, is that there exists in
America a spirit which possesses
and indulges a willingness to
impose punishment beyond our
ability to account for it rationally.
Nothing is wrong with
righteous anger and outrage. If
we never experienced it or acted
on it, we would be ill, morally
bankrupt, or in paradise. And
clearly our institutions for channeling and expressing that
outrage are morally advanced
from lynch mobs. But "how?" and
"how much?" are different questions. Regardless
of
how
stunned we may be at the havoc
wreaked by nine-year-old children
or by those with profound mental
illness, moral outrage expressed
by invoking the criminal process is
inappropriate. As to other situations, in which such outrage is
justified, we must be vigilant of
both upper and lower boundaries
in venting it. Too little punishment risks moral decay. Too

much risks cruelty. My the
that the current pressure is on
upper boundary.
Will we become kin
and gentler, at least in this ar
criminal punishment? Not u
two things happen. First, we m
overcome the intuition that
er and harsher punishments
alleviate the crime problem.
must stop blaming the fever
the aspirin. We must cease c
ouflaging retributive impulse ~,
rhetoric about deterrence, edu
tion, and "wars on crime." \
must, in short, own up to o
thirst for revenge. Second,
must want to reduce that thir
The revenge instinct is strong; it
probably insuperable by mer
human effort.
To the extent one thin
the punishments chronicled abo
are proportionate expression
righteous moral outrage, it is netther necessary nor advisable t
become kinder and gentler. For
those of us who would like to
change, who see in ourselves mor
thirst for revenge than we like t
admit, we will often find changin
very difficult. Anger and angui h
frustration and fear are not light·
heartedly left unrequited. The
beasts are overcome only with profound struggle.
One helpful strategy is to follow those who lead by example.
They live in all times, culture
and traditions. The patriarch
Abraham, as well as Gandhi, Mar·
tin Luther King, Jr., and Mother
Teresa all come to mind. At ~
University under the cross, it
shouldn't be too difficult to thin
of one more. 0

TM Cressel

